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be most favorable after the war, because the favorable forces need 
not spend themselves in price skyrocketing as they did last_ time, 
but rather can exert their most powerful influence to an outburst in 
production that should permit the United States to achieve levels 
heretofore unknown, and levels that" will keep the tax base high, 
therefore, the tax yield high-all to maintain unimpaired the highest 
integrity any, debt ever had-'-the debt of our government. 
THE FUTURE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 
HERBER'r HEATON 
University of J1innesota 
This subject is not of my own choosing. I was drafted, and· must 
make three conscientious objections to the assignment. In the first 
place I am not a prophet. In the· second, I do not regard any po-
litical institution, distribution of power, or economic system as 
final, but history gives no clue to indicate what the next phase in 
the development of an empire or of a social order is likely to be. 
And in the third place, I cannot do either justice or mercy to· a 
quarter of the land surface of the world and to a quarter of its· 
population in thirty minutes. 
Let me begin by considering what is this Empire with whose 
future we are concerned. Some Britons would suggest it has 110 
future because it is already a thing of the past, and ·has given place 
to, or been transformed into, the British. Commonwealth of Na-
tions. If empire means the exercise by one nation of politicar con-
trol over other peoples of diverse origin and culture, the new name 
is more accurate than the old. ,vorld War I lifted the already inter-
nally self-governing dominions-Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
and South Africa_:_to the rank of nations. The contributions they 
made to that war were a substantial fraction of the British Em-
pire's total effort. They were'larger still when measured in terms of 
the dominions' assets in human or physical resources; New Zealand· 
lost one in every 66 of her whole population, Australia one in every 
93, while our figure was one in every 2,000. They overshadowed the 
contrioutions made by many small nations; Canada for example, 
lost more men than Portugal put into the field. Thus at a great 
price the overseas dominions gained the right to be grown-up part-
ners,· associates, members of a British Commonwealth of Nations, 
and this title was hatched while the war was on. In addition they 
won recognition as nations in the world when they secured direct 
representation at the peace conference, signed the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, became foundation members of the League of Nations, and in 
three cases were given control of territory they had conquered, as 
"mandatory powers." · 
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The consequences of that development of a generation ago are 110w 
clear. In the imperial conference of 1926, the position of Great Britain 
and of the overseas dominions was put into words. The much-quoted 
description reads: "They are autonomous communities within the 
British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another 
in any aspect of their domestic or foreign affairs, though united by a ' 
- common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members 
of the British Commonwealth of Nations." What has autonomy -
meant? The answer_s are abundant. 
The younger d_ominions have established their own embassies in 
, Washington, Paris, Moscow, Chungking, arid elsewhere. They have· 
their high commissioners iu each capital of the Commonwealth to 
ser,1e as inter-dominion ambassadors. They have negotiated treaties 
with foreign governments and with each other. Diplomatic actions 
taken by Britain do not bind any of her associate nations unless they 
definitely accept them. When Britain signed the Locarno Pact in 
1925, and gave her pledge to help France if she was attacked by 
Germany, but to go to the aid of Germany if France ,vas the ag-
. gressor, the dominions were not committed to help Britain if the 
need arose, since they took no part in the negotiations. Similarly dur-
ing the thirties, when so many of us were crying, "Why don't the 
British do something?" the British had to remember that they had 
110 claim on support from the overseas dominions if they did inter-
vene in Abyssinia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, or Spain. 
They did not even know what the other dominions would do in 
September, 1939, when Britain declared war 011 Germany. The de-
cision to come into the war or stay out was one to be made by each 
dominion. Australia and New Zealand promptly said, "Of course we 
are in it," and did not bother to make a formal declaration of_ war, 
but Eire, Canada, and South Africa exercised their sovereign right. 
The Canadian parliament deliberated, and decided well-nigh unani-
mously to come in .. The South African parliament heard its premier 
recommend a policy of neutrality;·it heard its deputy-premier, Gen-
eral Smuts, recommend a break with Germany; then it voted, and 
by the narrow m[],rgin of 80 to 67 it decided on war. Eire had long 
before announced that in the event of war she would remain neu-
tral, and has doiie so. The German ambassador is· still in Dub,lin; 
there has been no black-out; if a flying fortress made a forced land.: . 
ing in Eire its crew would be interned; the landing of American 
troops in Ulster was violently protested by Dtiblin, even though 
Ulster is part of, the United Kingdom and not of Eire; the use of 
Irish harbors has been refused to the United States, though neutral 
_ Portugal granted the use of her harbors and air-bases in the Azores; 
and Dublin has rejected every suggestion from Washington that she 
sever diplomatic relations with Berlin or close her ports against the 
arrival of Nazi refi1gees. If that is not autonomy, I don't know 
what it is. 
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Autonomy is only one s·ide of the Commonwealth currency. If 
you examine Canadian coins1 you ,will find King George's head on 
one side, and an elk, beaver, or maple leaf on the other. On the 
Australian currency there is the king's head and a kangaroo or a 
couple of ostriches, or some other representative of the antipodean 
· flora or fauna. And so on, throughout the Commonwealth, except in 
Eire, where one side has a picture of an ancient Irish harp as back-
ing for pictures of pigs or poultry. The use of the royal head sym-
bolizes the crown as the constitutional link-the only one-between 
the parts of the Commonwealth, but it is not the head of the Em-
peror of the Commonwealth. George VI is Empei·or of India, but 
not of the Empire. There is no such office, no imperial constitution, 
legislature, executive, judicature, tariff, tax system, defense sys-
tem, or even membership clues. There are six dominions; each uses 
the same person to serve as its king; and in each the king observes 
the same rules, acting on the advice of his ministers, who in turn are 
responsible· to the parliament of their dominion. The Canadian 
parliament instructed its ministers to advize George VI of Canada 
to declare that Canada was at war with Germany-and did so 
about a week after George had been advized by his British minis-
ters to declare that the United Kingdom was at war with Germany. 
This is all that "united by a common allegiance to the Crown" 
means in terms of constitutional forms and powers, but symbols 
still mean a lot more than that to most of us, and a common king 
is as good as a11y other symbol that the wits or emotions of man-
kind have yet been able to devize. · 
Th(; reality behind the symbol is the "free association" of the six 
Commonwealth nations-or the five, if we leave Eire out for many 
purposes. It is interesting to note how Canadian, South African, and 
Australasian students see the Commonwealth. Professor Trotter, a 
Canadian, speaks of it as "a free and voluntary partnership or asso-
ciation of nations." Dean Bailey of the Melbourne Law School says 
it is "an association or organization for common action of a group of 
communities historically linked by settlement or conquest with 
Britain." General Smuts, the South African statesman who fought 
the British so brilliantly in the South African War of 1899-1902,. 
describes it as "a group of sovereign states, working together, living 
together in peace and in war under a system that has stood the 
greatest strain to which any nation can be subjected." The Canadian 
Prime Minister described the working rules of this partnership, asso-
ciation, or group as "close consultation, close cooperation, and ef-
fective coordination of policies." 
There is no time to spare for giving many examples of this con-
sultation, cooperation, and. coordination. The consultation nowa-
days can be very close and even continuous. The high commis-
sioners get together in each capital, the coming of the interconti-
nental telephone allows the prime ministers to ring each other up 
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whenever they wish, while trans-oceanic flying. enables two or even 
all of them to get together in conference at short notice. Cooperation 
and coordination have been marked, especially in times of crisis. 
In 1982, for example, when international trade had collapsed under 
the burden of the depression, of our heightened tariff, and of quotas 
or exchange controls, the dominions gathered in Ottawa and worked 
out tariff agreements which aimed at preserving and stimulating 
the flow of goods.between themselves.· 
When war drew near, five of them cooperated in establishing a 
Coinmonwealth Air Training Plan in order to get good flyers in 
abundance· and in quick time. Canada undertook the administration 
of this scheme, and if you have seen young men walking 'round the 
Twin Cities wearing the R.A.F. blue uniforms, but with "Great 
Britain," "Canada," "Australia," "South Africa," or "New Zealand" 
on their shoulders, you may have gained an inkling of the scope of 
the training plan. 
Since 1989 cooperation and coordination have been many-sided, 
with each dominion doing the job for which it was best fitted. 
Britain bought all Australia's wool-clip in order to strengthen that 
dominion's :financial position. Australia swung her primary produc-
tion and manufacturing industries into line to supply many of the 
needs of the Near East and India. Canada did likewise, and when 
the British supply of dollars required for buying Canadian produce 
ran out, Canada made a free unconditional gift of a billion dollars 
worth of supplies in 1942, with more to follow. In short the Com1 
monwealth was a pioneer version of the United Nations. 
A moment ago I quoted some descriptions of the Commonwealth 
made by inhabitants of the younger dominions. An Englishman, or 
rather a Welshman, remembering something these others had over-
looked, said the Commonwealth is "ari association of free states with 
a tail of dependent states." At the top of that tail is India, which 
in less than a century-and really in the last quarter of a century, 
since 1919-has advanced to complete self-govermnent in the 
eleven British Indian provinces. In addition Indians sit in eleven of 
the fifteen seats around the Viceroy's central executive council 
table, hold nearly all the high civil service positions, occupy nearly 
all the public health, engineering, and judicial posts, and do all the 
provincial administrative jobs. Indians fill the provincial legisla-
tures, and control the Indian ministers in them; they occupy the 
overwhelming majority of the seats in the central legislature as 
well. 
Lower down the tail we encounter about fifty other parts of the 
dependent empire. Ceylon, Bermuda, and Southern Rhodesia are 
, now near to full self-government; the others are further away, but 
are moving up. Most of this dependent empire is under British con-
trol, but some of it is under that of the other dominions. Canada, 
for example, rules the arctic far north, which is now becoming im-
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, portant because of air routes. South Africa holds the.mandate over 
ex-German Southwest Africa. Australia was given Papua in New 
Guinea in 1906, and then received a mandatae over German New 
Guinea, which she had captured in 1914. New Zealan9- has one or 
two Pacific islands which she held before 1914 or received as man-
dates. Hence these four junior dominions have little empires of their 
o~vn, and we might well talk of a British Commonwealth of Em-
pires. 
1\iletaphors and parables are dangerous devices, but perhaps I 
can sum up this description of the Commonwealth in one. Let me 
try bas~ball. The dominions have gone all the way 'round and have 
crossed the home plate to home rule. India is on third base. Some 
of the other players are on second or first, while other parts, such as 
Nigeria with its 20,000,000 natives, are out on the practice field 
learning to substitute tax systems, budgets, public works depart-
ments, schools, hospitals, experimental and demonstration farms, 
judicial pr~cedures, roads, tractors, and fertilizers for the slave-
raiding, inter-tribal war, witch-doctoring, head-hunting, cannibal-
ism, soothsaying and soil-scratching which used to be their form of 
sport. 
If a more serious si111ile is desired, I might suggest that of a 
species, except that I know no science. Let me risk it, and say that 
the Empire which took shape in that great age of trans-oceanic 
empire-building which followed the discoyery of America and of 
the all-sea route from Europe to the Indian Ocean, was a species 
which proved able to modify and a·clapt itself in an environment 
that was subject to far-reaching change. 
At least that simile is better than the one which was popular 
a hundred years ago. In those clays men used to say that an empire 
was like an apple tree. The apples would certainly fall off when they 
were ripe. But the British people's ability to adapt their own form 
of parliamentary government to democratic ideas and to transplant 
it overseas prevented the apples from falling off. Or there was the 
family metaphor, which said that children rebelled, left home, and 
disowned their parents when they felt strong enough to do so. Evi-
dently this does not necessarily happen if the youngsters discover 
that they are free to leave home and disown the old people. Even 
Eire, which became self-governing in 1922 and has since declared 
herself a republic and taken a number of steps to emphasize her 
independence, has never declared that she is quitting the Common-
wealth. When the question is no longer "Can I go out?" but 
"Where do I go?", it may seem better to remain a partner in a big 
show than a lonely little nation out on one's own arid in clanger of 
being ·swallowed up by some new empire-builder. 
The future of the Commonwealth depends on the strength of the 
ties which keep a group of free nations together. Some of them are 
historical, and history has a way of creating conditions and tracli-
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tions which-for good or ill-are tenacious. The British are where 
they are over the face of the earth for just the saine reason that we 
are here. The men who founded the East India Company from 
which British India grew were also the founders and financiers of 
Virginia and the Pilgrim Fathers and Massachusetts Bay. The par-
allel between their overseas movement and our overland westward 
movement is too close to allow us safely to throw stones. The hand 
of history is not a dead hand. It decided that India should be British 
rather than French or Portuguese or Dutch or Russian; that Cana-
da, having ceased to be French, should eventually become Canadian 
rather than Amei:ican; that Australasia was to be British (rather 
than French) ih sovereignty and population, and· radically demo-
cratic in character; and that the ocean routes which bound a maritimE 
. empire together must be made secure by the possession of strategic 
naval bases and ports of call. 
Some of the ties are economic. In their growth the colonies werE 
far more dependent on Britain than she was on them. Their immi-
grants and their capital were drawn chiefly or entirely from the 
, mother country, and they found their chief market .for _their food-
stuffs and raw materials in the crowded industrial populations of 
the British Isles. On the other hand the British were not nearly so 
dependent on the overseas empire; the world was their market and 
supplier of the things they needed, and of that world the colonies 
were only a part-perhaps a third. Hence they pursued a cosmo-
politan policy of free trade with all countries and continents. 
Today these conditions are. changed, but not entirely. The rise 
of other great industrial powers created a demand for dominion raw 
materials and gave Britain rivals in supplying the dominions with 
manufactured goods. Canada is an outstanding case; for at least a 
generation she has sold more to us and bought far more from us 
than to or from Britain. Similarly she has drawn far. more of her 
capital in recent years from New York than from London. In addi-
tion the development of her own manufactures has reduced her de-
pendence on British factories. Yet Canada can find little or no 
market in the United States for hel' prairie wheat or other food-
stuffs, and there is no other large market for them except the 
British. 
In the other dominions the dependence on Britain as market and 
as source of suppl5· is far greater; Eire sells over 90 per cent of her 
exports there, New Zealand over 80 per cent, and Australia over 50 
per cent; and these three get 40 to 60 per cent of their imports from 
her. They have drawn increasingly on the United States and other 
in.dustrial countries for their supplies, and under the stress of war 
have expanded their industrial plants greatly. In addition Britain 
has had to sell ·many of her overseas holdings of stocks and bonds 
· to pay for war supplies. The interest and profit from these used to 
be spent in buying food and raw material; or to put it another way, 
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the debtor dominions used to service their debt by exporting staple 
products to the creditor. In the future Britain will not be able to 
buy them with dividend checks or bond coupons. She will there-
fore have to buy by exporting her manufactured goods, her ship-
ping, and by commercial, insurance, and banking services. She esti-
mates that her exports must increase by 50 per cent if she is to buy 
abroad what she used to buy. Either the dominions and other coun-
tries must buy more from her or she will have to reduce greatly 
the purchases she makes from them; and if she has to do the latter 
every dominion, as well as every foreign country which used to sell 
her great quantities of butter ( e.g., Denmark) or of cotton ( e.g., the 
United States) will have a hard time finding other markets for its 
produce. If Britain is too poor to buy, the whole Commonwealth 
will feel the impoverishing effect; and so will nearly every foreign 
country, large or small. 
The third tie is that of defense. Through the period of their 
growth the colonies had no need to worry about defense, because the 
British navy was so strong that no other power was in a position to 
launch an attack on them or on· any other part of the world. The 
colonies could therefore go their own way, increase their self-govern-
ing powers, emphasize their growing independence and nationality, 
and do it all without spending more than a few cents a head on 
defense. In an age of safety you can afford to be as centrifugal as 
you like, and build up a lot of small nations. When the safety goes 
the lot of those who have self-determined themselves into inde-
pendence becomes very hazardous. Self-government foi· the Philip-
pines might have been a safe policy in 1900, or earlier; but once Japan 
became a great power in the Western Pacific, self-government might 
mean suicide. Similiarly self-government for India might in the 10th 
century have meant handing the peninsula over to be ta.ken by 
Russia, and in the 20th century to be ta.ken by Japan or other pos-
sible possessors of large appetites. · 
Even in the piping peace of last century, fear of external danger 
was not quite unknown. Fear of an attack by us pushed the Ca-
nadian provinces into federation 'in the sixties, and the appearance 
of the Germans in the south-west Pacific helped to pull the six 
states together into the Commonwealth of Australia in 1000. 
The British Commonwealth has never assumed that it could 
defend itself against any conceivable combination of powers, but 
only that it could take care of the seas and make a. substantial con-
tribution in men, money, and materials to its allies on land. That 
strategy was severely strained in World War I when one ally (Rus-
sia) fell out, when France lost much of her industrial area, aud' 
-ivhen the submarine proved so menacing. It was even more so when 
France fell in _1940, when Italy came in, and when for twelve grim 
months the British Commonwealth stood solitary but solid. The 
epic of that "Year Alone," with its defiance of the Luftwaffe, its 
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defence of North Africa, and its puncturing of :Mussolini's empire, 
, well justified Mr. Churchill's assertion that if the British Common-
wealth and Empire lasted for a thousand years, "men will still say 
'This was their finest hour.'" No one can say what might eventu-
ally have happened if Hitler had confined his efforts to the western 
front and had left Russia alone; and it is also impossible to say what 
might have happened if in such a situation Japan had joined its 
European Axis partners and had declared war on the Common-
wealth but had left us alone. I don't think, however, that anyone 
will be accused of being an alarmist for feeling that an Axis con-
centration on the Commonwealth would have been irresistible. 
The conclusion of these two world war experiences is inescapable. 
The British Commonwealth needs friends and allies, or better still 
must be part of a world peace organization. In that 'respect it is not 
alone, for no large power that we can conceive can do without 
friends and allies or fail to be safer in a world organized for peace. 
We certainly could not stand alone against all the rest of mankind. 
We have shown our realistic sense of that by our entry into the first 
World War and by the policy we were pursuing prior to Pearl 
Harbor as well as since. I think it is equally certain that Russia is 
in the same position, but since my concern here is with the British, 
let me stick to their problems. 
In the first place Britain will emerge from this war greatly weak-
ened in many of the ways in which she was strong. Her foreign 
trade has shrunk by at least half, and will be hard to recover, as 
may be her shipping business. She has lost most of her overseas 
investments, and the _income from them. She will probably be a 
debtor country rather than a creditor; already India has had such 
an excess· of sales to her that the whole Indian debt on British in-
, vestments has been wiped out, and in addition Britain is now in 
debt to India to the tune of $4,000,000,000. So also with Canada, 
Australia, Argentina, and of course there is our own lend-lease 
creditor position. Finally, before the war Britain's population was 
reaching the stationary level, was becoming middle aged, and 
seemed doomed to decline in the decades ahead-not a unique 
prospect, but an·uncomfortable one. 
· In the second place, the dominions in the Pacific are not large 
enough to defend themselves unaided, and if Britain is engrossed 
in a life and death struggle in Europe, she cannot give very much 
help east of Suez. The aid has to come from us, and our own intei'.·-
ests impel us to give it; for whatever we may feel or think about 
the Commonwealth we could not be very comfortable if either Ger-
many or an Asiatic power controlled the west-central and south-
west Pacific. It may be that the Australasian dominions will step 
up their efforts to increase immigration and development, so that 
within a generation their population may grow from its present 
8,500,000 to perhaps twice that figure. If they can do that they will 
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be less vulnerable, but still not strong enough to deal unaided with 
a first class power if it determined to annex them. 
In the third place, Canada's dual position as a member of the 
Commonwealth and as a part of the Americas has been empha-
sized by the events of the last generation. She has no desire to leave 
the Commonwealth, and no desire to throw her· lot in politically 
with the United States. She might have sheltered behind the latest 
version of the Monroe Doctrine and played little part in the pres-
ent war; but that possibility was not given a moment's thought by 
her leaders, and she shouldered her full share of the obligations of 
Commonwealth partnership. Some of us were a bit annoyed in 1939 
at this manifestation of her connection with the world outside; but 
it should be noted tha:t the British counterparts of those "some of 
us" often get annoyed at Canada's insistence in her North Ameri-
canism. Canada is in the Commonwealth and Canada has a big 
neighbor to her south. Those are the two basic facts of her con-
sciousness. Consequently, like Australia and N cw Zealand, she is 
now fully a ware of our existence and our importance to her, to the 
Commonwealth, and to the world. I think we have become a lot 
more aware of her importance to us, and this is a healthy situation 
all 'round. 
One question remains. What of the future of India in the Com-
monwealth; or even what of the future of Il1(;lia? Seven out of every 
ten citizens of the Commonwealth live there, and if they left it they 
would greatly reduce it in size, population, and prestige. What hap-
pens in India in the years ahead is up to the Indian people them-
selves. Up to date the introduction of self-government by instal-
ments has not met any insuperable obstacles. True, Gandhi and his 
Congress party have accused the British of offering too little too 
late. To this the British have replied that the Congress wanted 
too much too quickly. The achievement so far has been in the field 
of provincial government. Indian legislatures now control the law-~ 
making in each province, Indian ministers administer the laws and 
the provincial civil service is virtually all Indian. This is a re-
markable achievement, and has been possible because it encoun-
tered no serious impediment. The next step-the "federation of the 
whole peninsula-has, however, failed to bridge the chasms which 
divide Indian society. The first is that which separates the self-
governing provinces of British India from the six hundred native 
states which are still ruled by princes, rajahs, nabobs, and so forth. 
The second is the racial and religious chasm: on one side stand 
about 90,000,000 Moslems, on the other side are 300,000,000 Hin-
dus; the dislike is mutual, ineradicable, and intense. The third is 
the caste system, with its watertight compartments, and at its base 
60,000,000 outcasts, untouchables,· "depressed classes." Adel- to 
these divisions the lack of everi three or four popular tongues, the 
wide range of social habits, and the absence of inter-marriage be-
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tween races or classes, and the task of creating E pluribus wiuni 
·becomes gigantic. Two efforts have failed. A federal constitution 
drafted in 1935 was rejected by all the sections, races, classes, and 
religions. In 1942 Sir Stafford Cripps, socialist, internationalist, and 
anti-imperialist was sent to India to see if he could bring unity. His 
mission was twofold. The leaders of the Indian parties were invited 
to enter -the Viceroy's e·xecutive council and take over every de-
partment and post except that of commander-in-chief. They were 
asked to be ready,· as soon as the war was over, to gather in a con-
stitutional convention a1id work out an accepted plan for an Indian 
Union. This- plan London pledged itself to accept, even if it pro-
_vided, not for dominion status within the Commonwealth, but for 
self-goyernment outside the Commonwealth. With the Japs on the 
frontier, the Indian parties still could not sink their differences 
enough to accept either invitation. The nearer the hour of their 
liberation drew, the. more they were at sixes and sevens; and even 
India's deepest sympathizers have to confess their belief that civil 
war would h3: ve broken out the minute the people of India were left 
free of British rule and restraint. 
The future of the Indian, o·ne-fifth of the human race, is unpre-
dictable. Will the British stay there until Indians resolve their dif-
ferences? If and when they do resolve them and create an Indian 
Union, will the union endure, or will it go to pieces when put to the 
strain of racial, religious, and social differences? If it works, will it 
secede from the Commonwealth? .No one can answer these ques-
tions. India now has many new assets of strength that she lacked 
a generation ·ago. Three million volunteers have been trained in the 
army-twice as many men as the whole membership of the Con-
. gress party. They have learned to handle trucks, tanks, planes, big 
guns and little ones. Industry has gone ahead by leaps and bounds 
both before and since 1!)39. The country is rich, or at least some 
people in it have become rich through industry and the war. ·Britain 
owes India four billion dollars, and the amount will be larger before -
the war ends. Does one disown a debtor? If the British' go out, do·es 
· anybody else come in? At any rate, watch India in the years ahead. 
She 1nay become what we have so optimistically assumed that China 
is destined to become-a great power. · 
For the rest of the Commonwealth, its future is wrapped up in 
that of the world at large. If we can achieve a settlement which has a 
chance to endure, and can restore international trade ,oll' some basis 
of sanity and health, the political future of the British Common-
wealth need not worry anyone. Certainly the Commoi1wealth can 
contribute much to that peace and security, for its · 1ands are in 
every ·continent and _its trade routes on every ocean. If no real world 
security can be secured, then the British Commonwealth, like our-
selves, will have to weigh its policy in terms of a balance of forces 
in which international anarchy can be restrained only by interna-
